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ABSTRACT
The validity of a concept inventory is imperative to its adoption by the educa-
tion community. In this thesis, we evaluate the validity of the Cybersecurity
Concept Inventory for assessing student knowledge of core cybersecurity con-
cepts after a first course on the topic. Our evaluation involved expert review
and student performance data. A panel of 12 experts in cybersecurity re-
viewed each item of the Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI), and the
majority agreed that every item measured appropriate cybersecurity knowl-
edge. We gave the CCI to 142 students from six different institutions taking
a first cybersecurity course either online or proctored by the professor of the
course. We used Classical Test Theory to evaluate the quality of the CCI.
This evaluation showed that the CCI is sufficiently reliable for measuring stu-
dents’ knowledge of cybersecurity and that the CCI may be too difficult as a
whole. We describe the results of both the expert review and the pilot test in
further detail and provide recommendations for the continued improvement
of the CCI.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Computers are becoming ubiquitous: they are used in diverse contexts in-
cluding medical equipment, cars, and appliances. Due to this ubiquity, both
cybersecurity experts and non-experts involved in these fields need to un-
derstand the core concepts of cybersecurity. For example, after a string of
ransomware attacks targeted hospitals, Wirth called for healthcare technol-
ogy management professionals to undertake cybersecurity training [1]. The
number of fields requiring basic cybersecurity concepts will likely continue to
rise as attackers’ targets expand.
Because the industries being affected by cyberattacks are expanding, secu-
rity professionals are in high demand. This demand cannot be met with the
current levels of cybersecurity education, however. Libicki et al. [2] go as far
as to say “the shortage of cybersecurity experts in the federal government is
serious to the point of being a national security threat to the United States.”
Despite the importance and ubiquity of cybersecurity, there is little research
on how to teach cybersecurity effectively. A valid and broadly used concep-
tual instrument for cybersecurity is a vital resource for supporting rigorous
research on the efficacy of various teaching methods for cybersecurity educa-
tion. Unfortunately, at this time, there are no validated research instruments
to assess students’ conceptual knowledge of cybersecurity.
Sherman et al. began the Cybersecurity Assessment Tools (CATS) project
to meet this need for validated research instruments to assess the effective-
ness of cybersecurity education [3–8]. The CATS Project is developing two
concept inventories (CIs) to evaluate how well teaching practices help stu-
dents learn core cybersecurity concepts: the Cybersecurity Concept Inven-
tory (CCI) and Cybersecurity Curriculum Assessment (CCA). The CCI as-
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sesses how well a student has learned the basic concepts of cybersecurity after
one cybersecurity course. The CCA assesses how well a student has learned
cybersecurity concepts after completing a full cybersecurity curriculum.
1.2 Validity and Concept Inventories
CIs have been used to show that students regrettably succeed in traditional
assessments through fact memorization rather than conceptual understand-
ing [9–11]. With a deeper conceptual understanding, students can learn more
efficiently in the future and can transfer their knowledge across contexts [11].
CIs have been effectively used to promote the adoption of evidence-based
teaching practices across STEM that are conducive to students developing a
deeper conceptual understanding [9, 10,12].
A CI can be powerful and useful only if it is deemed as a valid instrument
by the education community that will use the instrument. A CI is valid if it
effectively evaluates targeted concepts and can be used to draw a reasonable
inference of student knowledge [13]. The validity of the instrument is es-
tablished by a set of evidence and arguments about whether the instrument
can be appropriately used to draw these inferences. To establish the valid-
ity of our instrument, we are following the design and evaluation framework
recommended by the National Research Council [14, 15].
1.3 Outline of Thesis
In this thesis, we review the development process of the CCI, and we com-
pare that process with the development of other CIs. We then describe the
framework we use to evaluate whether the CCI can be used validly to assess
student knowledge of cybersecurity concepts. We then describe the research
methods for the expert panel review and pilot test with students. We ana-
lyze the results of this pilot test using Classical Test Theory (CTT). We then
discuss these findings to identify the strengths of the CCI and to recommend
future improvements for the CCI.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The National Research Council recommends establishing a cognitive frame-
work for the design of an instrument [15]. This cognitive framework defines
what knowledge of a concept should be assessed and the ways in which stu-
dents reveal their knowledge, or lack of knowledge, about that topic. Prior
work on the CATS Project has focused on establishing this cognitive frame-
work, providing baseline arguments for the validity of the CCI.
Because a test cannot be universally valid for every population or pur-
pose, we need to define carefully the contexts, populations, and purposes for
which the CCI is valid. We intended the CCI to measure the cybersecu-
rity conceptual knowledge of students who have completed a first course in
cybersecurity. Cybersecurity is taught to an increasingly wide range of stake-
holders, including policymakers, computer scientists, medical professionals,
and business professionals. Each stakeholder’s courses vary in focus and
depth. Because of this high variance, we have chosen to optimize the CCI for
the largest population of cybersecurity professionals—computer scientists.
While the CCI may provide useful insights about the conceptual knowledge
of policymakers or others, our goal is to have the instrument provide the
most insight about computer science students.
2.1 CATS Project
In accordance with the recommendations of the National Research Council,
we based the design of the CCI on the consensus opinions of a panel of experts
and on documented student misconceptions [3, 4, 6].
Parekh et al. [3] began the CATS Project development by identifying the
core concepts of cybersecurity using a Delphi process. A Delphi process is a
rigorous and structured method for creating consensus among experts about
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potentially contentious issues, such as what subset of concepts should be
included on the CCI [16]. A Delphi process has been used to identify the
cognitive framework of several previous CIs [17]. The Delphi process for
the CCI identified five concepts all related to adversarial thinking to include
in the CCI seen in Table 2.1 [3]. From these concepts, Sherman et al. [5]
developed cybersecurity scenarios that require students to understand these
concepts. For example, a scenario that covers the concept Confidentiality, In-
tegrity, Availability, and Authentication Attacks (C) involves a hypothetical
government facility where we define defenses and biometric authentication
methods. This scenario defines the defenses that allow for questions on po-
tential attacks that could exploit the defenses.
Table 2.1: Five Core Concepts of Cybersecurity
Identify Vulnerabilities and Failures (V)
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, and Authentication Attacks (C)
Devise a Defense (D)
Identify the Security Goals (G)
Identify Potential Targets and Attackers (T)
Using these scenarios, Scheponik et al. [4] performed think-aloud inter-
views to discover students’ misconceptions and problematic reasoning about
cybersecurity [6]. Example forms of problematic reasoning include students’
beliefs that encryption protects against most any cybersecurity threat and
the belief that cybersecurity threats come only from outside an organization.
Using findings from these interviews and the scenarios developed by Sher-
man et al. [5], we created the CCI multiple-choice questions, called items.
Each CCI item consists of a scenario, a stem (i.e., a question about the sce-
nario), and five answer options. One option is correct, and the other four
are incorrect. The incorrect options are called distractors and are based on
the interview findings. A student answers an item by choosing one option.
If the student chooses the correct option, the student’s answer is correct. If
the student chooses a distractor or does not choose an option, the answer is
considered incorrect. The student’s score on the CCI is the total number of
items that the student answers correctly. This score ranges from 0 to 25.
In this thesis, we followed the National Research Council’s recommended
development process. We assembled a panel of 12 experts to review whether
the draft CCI indeed matched the targeted cognitive framework. Once an
instrument is created, it should be administered to its targeted demographic
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and be statistically evaluated [15]. We administered a pilot test of the CCI
to a group of 142 students from six universities to evaluate whether students
responded to items on the CCI according to our expectations from the in-
terviews. We use statistical analysis of student responses to determine what
inferences can be validly drawn from administrations of the CCI.
2.2 Classical Test Theory (CTT)
Jorion et al. [18] outlined three basic properties of a valid CI: CI indicates
overall understanding of the concepts, CI indicates understanding of a spe-
cific concept, CI indicates misconceptions or student errors. Jorion et al.
recommended using a series of statistical tests to demonstrate whether a CI
possesses these properties [18]. CTT is often the first evaluation paradigm
used to evaluate an instrument because it is useful with small sample sizes
[19]. CTT is more practical than more exhaustive analytics such as Item
Response Theory (IRT) because CTT allows us to find problematic items
and distractors and suggest modifications with fewer students than required
for an IRT analysis. This analysis enables rapid iteration and improvement
of the CI.
According to CTT, an assessment instrument should minimize error. All
of the instrument’s items should test a single construct. Each item should
be neither too hard nor too easy. Each item should provide a good estimate
of the student’s overall ability
2.3 Reliability
Reliability is a measure of the likelihood that repeated measurements of the
same student will yield the same score. If an instrument is not reliable, it
cannot be valid.
In CTT, the core assumption is that a student’s observed score (X) consists
of two hypothetical values: a student’s true score (T) and some random error
(E) [19]. This model is expressed symbolically as X = T + E [17]. If a test
is not biased, then the average error is zero. As a consequence, the student’s
true score would be the average of an infinite number of administrations of
5
the text [20]. A reliable instrument minimizes the error so the observed score
best reflects the student’s understanding.
The conventional measurement used for internal reliability is Cronbach’s
α. Cronbach’s α is “an estimate of the correlation between two random
samples of items from a universe of items like those in the test” [21]. We can
determine Cronbach’s α without administering the CCI multiple times if two
conditions are met: (1) the instrument measures a single construct, and (2)
the item is either correct or incorrect [17]. A reliable instrument will lead to
α values that are close to 1.
There is no universally acceptable Cronbach value, but 0.8 is considered
good and 0.7 is the minimum value considered satisfactory according to
Panayides [22] and Jorion et al. [18].
Cronbach’s α is also used to coarsely evaluate the quality of each item. The
addition of each item should increase the overall reliability of the instrument
[17]. By removing an item and then recalculating the α value, we can judge
the quality of that specific item. When the removal of an item increases the
value of α, the item is particularly poor and should be removed.
The standard error is a function of α and defines a confidence interval for
each student’s true score. We calculate standard error using
SE = Sx
√
1− α
where Sx is the standard deviation of the sample and α is the Cronbach’s
α. When the standard error is small, we can be confident that students with
different observed scores have different true scores.
2.4 Difficulty and Discrimination
Reliability alone does not indicate the instrument provides a valid represen-
tation of student knowledge. The validity of the instrument can be further
established by examining each item’s difficulty and discrimination. The dif-
ficulty of an item is the fraction of students with the correct response [19].
Each item of the instrument should have a balanced range of difficulties
falling within 0.2 to 0.8 [17, 18]. When the difficulty is outside this range, it
does not effectively separate students with different levels of understanding.
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The discrimination of an item is the point-biserial correlation between the
item and the overall performance [18]. When an item’s discrimination is low,
weaker students (low total scores) perform similarly to stronger students
(high total scores) on that item. A good item will have a discrimination of
at least 0.2 [17]. An item with proper discrimination and difficulty will fall
within the largest square area as noted by the dotted lines in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Validity of Discrimination and Difficulty
2.5 Distractor Analysis
Distractor analysis utilizes the information about the answers choices stu-
dents chose to better identify why including an item did not improve α or
why the item has a difficulty and discrimination outside the accepted range.
To analyze distractors we split the students into tertiles (thirds) according to
total scores. After splitting the students, we take the proportion of students
selecting each response [19]. There are certain trends we expect to see: (1)
the percentage of students selecting the correct answer should increase from
the bottom third to the top third, (2) the item’s difficulty for the top third
of students should be near 0.8, (3) each distractor should have a negative
discrimination value [23]. The discrimination value of a distractor is the dis-
crimination when the distractor is considered to be the correct answer. The
discrimination value of the correct answer is the same as the discrimination
of the item.
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2.6 Concept Subtests
Cronbach’s α can be applied to a group of items called a subtest. In our
case, we propose that there may be 5 subtests in the CCI, each aligning
with the five concepts identified in the Delphi process. We evaluate these
subtests separately to assess reliability to determine whether we can interpret
understanding of the concepts from these subtests alone. Ideally, each subtest
should have a reliability similar to the overall instrument. In practice, having
a similar reliability to the entire instrument is difficult because each subtest
has fewer items and the value of Cronbach’s alpha tends to increase with the
number of items.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
3.1 Expert Panel
The initial CCI comprised the 32 items developed using the processes de-
scribed earlier. We gave these items to an expert panel consisting of 11
professors with backgrounds in cybersecurity and one cybersecurity profes-
sional for review. The experts each received the initial CCI online containing
each of the items. We asked experts to rate each item on the scale Accept,
Accept with Minor Revisions, Accept with Major Revisions, and Reject, and
to comment on the item. After they answered the item, experts were shown
the correct answer and given the option to provide additional comments on
the correct answer.
The expert comments mainly concerned the clarity of items. We addressed
their comments and then checked back with them for approval of the updated
items. An example of how we addressed these comments is in Section 4.1.
For some items, the experts disagreed with the content or the correct
answer. When the experts disagreed, we omitted that item from the CCI.
After we removed these items, the experts’ reviews were used to rate the
remaining items. The highest rated items were incorporated into the current
CCI.
During the expert reviews, we continued developing items for the CCI.
These items were intended to be used as alternates. One alternate item,
Q25, was not reviewed by experts but was included. We thought this item
evaluated the core concept C better than those that were reviewed. This
item and those with the best reviews form the current 25 item CCI.
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3.2 Current CCI
We selected items with a range of difficulties based on our best estimation.
There were six easy items, 16 medium items, and three hard items. The
actual performance of students would likely differ from our estimations. Each
item covers one of the five major concepts shown in Table 2.1. The items
are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A. This table shows the name, concept,
topic of each item in the current CCI.
3.3 Pilot Test
The goal of the pilot test was to administer the current CCI to a small group
of 100-200 students and then use the results of this pilot test to suggest
modifications to the instrument. We concluded the pilot test in December
2018 after 142 students from six universities completed the CCI.
Professors at each university had the option of administering a paper ver-
sion or online version of the CCI. Both versions included the instructions
seen in Appendix A. The distractors, scenarios, and questions were identical
in both versions.
A professor proctored the paper version of the CCI by allocating 50 minutes
for students to take the 25 item CCI in class. Students then completed the
CCI to the best of their abilities. The professor collected the CCI papers and
sent them to us. Then we recorded each student’s answer to every item.
If the professor decided to administer the online version, students were
provided a link to the CCI. The online version differed from the paper version
in three ways. First, the online version had a random ordering of distractors.
Second, items that shared a scenario were randomly ordered within that
scenario. For example, if Q1 and Q2 are the two items in the one scenario,
Q1 could appear before or after Q2 but always together with it. The reason
for randomizing the online version was to dissuade collusion between students
and to minimize any possible effect of item order on student performance.
Because students who had access were all in the same course they may have
attempted to work together even if they received no benefit from receiving
a better score. Third, there was no hard time limit. Students were told to
spend 50 minutes but this was not strictly enforced. The student completed
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the online version and then selected a submit button to save and submit their
CCI.
3.4 Pilot Demographics
The universities included in the pilot test have diverse locations and popu-
lations. Universities A and D are large Midwestern public universities. Each
has over 40 thousand students enrolled. University E is a large public uni-
versity from the Southwest with over 40 thousand students enrolled. Univer-
sities B, C, F are smaller universities from the Midwestern and Eastern part
of the United States. These Universities have 10 thousand or fewer students
enrolled.
The demographics of the study including institution and response rate
are in Table 3.1. University A was the only group given the CCI in paper
format. At University D, a link to the instrument was sent to six members
of a professional engineering club who were taking the course. At the other
universities, a professor sent a link to the instrument to the students in the
course.
Table 3.1: Breakdown of Students by University
University Number of Students Potential Number of Students Response Rate (%)
University A 91 120 76
University B 12 20 60
University C 1 12 16
University D 6 6 100
University E 17 50 34
University F 12 20 60
No University Specified 3
Total 142 228 62
3.5 Incomplete Submissions
Two types of null responses were discarded. The first was 12 responses in
which no effort was made to complete the CCI, leaving all items blank. The
second was three response from a student who began the CCI but did not
continue and terminated it early (completing fewer than 5 items). If a student
completed the majority of the items but left a minority blank, their results
were included.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
In this chapter, we present results from the expert review of the CCI and
our psychometric analysis of students’ responses to the CCI. To help the
reader interpret our findings, we compare our results with three CIs evaluated
with the same techniques. These CIs are the Concept Assessment Tool for
Statics (27 questions and 1,372 students), the Statistics Concept Inventory
(38 questions and 402 students), and the Dynamics Concept Inventory (29
questions and 5,966 students) [18]. We chose these CIs because they are the
few technical CIs that analyzed the CIs using similar techniques.
4.1 Expert Panel
The expert panel consisted of 12 experts in cybersecurity or a related field.
These experts reviewed each of the individual items and rated them on a scale
of Accept, Accept with Minor Revisions, Accept with Major Revisions, and
Reject. The results of this review process can be seen in Figure 4.1. Although
32 items were reviewed, the figure presents the results for the 24 items in
the current CCI. The items selected for the CCI were reviewed positively
receiving a vast majority of Accept and Accept with Minor Revisions.
Additionally, experts left comments for each item which we used to revise
the items that received Reject ratings. As an example, we show how we
used expert reviews to revise item Q4. Q4 covered a potential SQL injection
vulnerability and the means of defending against it. The initial wording of
the Q4 scenario is below.
Scenario A3 When a user Mike O’Brien registered a new ac-
count for an online shopping site, he was required to provide his
username, address, first and last name, and a password. Imme-
diately after Mike submitted his request, you—as the security
12
engineer—receive a database input error message in the logs.
Experts commented that this wording is imprecise because an error in the
logs is not “received” but rather written into the log on the server. The
word “received” implies the error was noticeable and could lead students
to infer that the error came from the client-side. The item was modified
to replace “receive a database input error” with “observe a database input
error.” The change makes it clear that the user input did not cause an alert
and that the message was logged on the server-side. The clarification will
lead students away from client-side solutions such as “more thoroughly test
the software before deploying it” and toward server-side solutions such as
the correct response, “sanitize input at the server side.” The expert review
process strengthened the clarity which is critical to measuring a student’s
conceptual knowledge.
Figure 4.1: Expert Response to Items
4.2 Reliability and Standard Error
Cronbach’s α is a measure of the reliability of the instrument. The Cron-
bach’s α of the CCI in this pilot test is 0.78 as seen in Table 4.2. This α is
close to Jorion et al.’s recommendation for good reliability of 0.80 and above
Panayiotis’s minimum recommendation of 0.70. The reliability of the CCI is
similar to other CIs as seen in Table 4.1. The reliability of the CCI suggests
that it is sufficiently reliable to be a valid CI.
The standard error of measurement defines a confidence interval for each
student’s true score. The standard measurement error of the CCI was 2.13
for this pilot test. A 2.13 standard error implies the 68% confidence interval
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for a student’s true score, given that a mean observed score of 8.61 points is
from 6.48 to 10.74.
Table 4.1: Comparison with Other Instruments
Measurement CCI Statics Statistics Dynamics
Cronbach’s α 0.78 0.84 0.64 0.74
Minimum Difficulty Value 0.10 0.16 0.03 0.06
Maximum Difficulty Value 0.66 0.78 0.87 0.91
Minimum Discrimination Value 0.16 0.18 -0.13 0.01
Maximum Discrimination Value 0.47 0.65 -0.57 0.56
Number of Items w/ Difficulty Below 0.2 5 1 3 4
Table 4.2: Instrument Statistics
Cronbach’s α 0.78
Standard Error of Measurement 2.13
Mean (Out of 25) 8.61
Standard Deviation 4.58
Cronbach’s α can be used as a coarse evaluation of the quality of an item.
The addition of each item should increase the quality of the instrument, and
excluding that item should decrease the overall reliability. Table 4.3 shows
the results of the Cronbach calculation with each item excluded. Ideally, for
each item the value of α with that item deleted should be less than the overall
value of α, 0.78. There are no items that decrease the overall reliability and
consequently need to be removed.
4.3 Difficulty and Discrimination
The difficulty of an item is the fraction of students with the correct response.
If an item is too hard, the item is separating only strong students from strong
students. If an item is too easy, it cannot differentiate any students. The
acceptable range of difficulty is between 0.20 and 0.80. The difficulty of each
item can be seen in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.4. The range of difficulty for
the CCI is 0.10 to 0.66. When compared to the other instruments the CCI
seen in Table 4.1, it is more difficult and will have less discriminatory power.
The CCI instrument overall is too difficult as evidenced by 21 out of 25
items having difficulty below 0.50 and 5 items falling outside the minimum
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Table 4.3: Cronbach’s α Analysis
Item Excluded Cronbach’s α Item Excluded Cronbach’s α
Q1 0.77 Q14 0.76
Q2 0.76 Q15 0.77
Q3 0.78 Q16 0.76
Q4 0.76 Q17 0.76
Q5 0.76 Q18 0.77
Q6 0.77 Q19 0.77
Q7 0.77 Q20 0.77
Q8 0.77 Q21 0.77
Q9 0.76 Q22 0.76
Q10 0.77 Q23 0.76
Q11 0.76 Q24 0.77
Q12 0.76 Q25 0.77
Q13 0.77
acceptable difficulty. This is more values below minimum than the other CIs
seen in Table 4.1.
The discrimination of an item indicates the amount of information an
item gives about the overall performance of the student. High discrimination
indicates that a student’s performance on a given item is highly correlated
to overall performance. The acceptable range of discrimination is anything
above 0.20. Figure 4.2 shows the discrimination of each item. The range of
discrimination is 0.16 to 0.47. The discrimination range is not as high as that
of other CIs seen in Table 4.1, but the bottom of the range is much higher
than the Statistics Concept Inventory and Dynamics Concept Inventory. The
other CIs had one, ten, and five items fall below the 0.20, while the CCI
had three items below 0.20. The fact that most of the items are above the
minimum value is an encouraging indicator that the assessment is valid.
4.4 Concept Subtests
The CCI consists of five concepts: V, C, D, G, and T. Each item assesses
one of these concepts. The individual items within a concept can be grouped
and the Cronbach’s α calculated to evaluate the reliability of that concept
subtest. The α’s of the concept subtests are seen in Table 4.5. When eval-
uating the concepts, it is notable that all of the values are significantly less
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Table 4.4: Difficulty and Discrimination of Each Item
Item Discrimination Difficulty Item Discrimination Difficulty
Q1 0.22 0.24 Q14 0.32 0.25
Q2 0.32 0.33 Q15 0.25 0.10
Q3 0.16 0.26 Q16 0.35 0.59
Q4 0.46 0.52 Q17 0.35 0.52
Q5 0.35 0.18 Q18 0.19 0.31
Q6 0.23 0.22 Q19 0.27 0.28
Q7 0.30 0.66 Q20 0.22 0.14
Q8 0.21 0.19 Q21 0.23 0.44
Q9 0.33 0.61 Q22 0.47 0.34
Q10 0.19 0.40 Q23 0.38 0.49
Q11 0.34 0.36 Q24 0.30 0.40
Q12 0.36 0.24 Q25 0.24 0.14
Q13 0.21 0.28
than 0.70 which is considered the minimum acceptable value for a reliable
instrument [22]. These findings suggest that the subtests should not be used
as evaluations of students’ knowledge of the specific concepts.
Table 4.5: Cronbach’s α by Concept
Concept Cronbach’s α Items Included
V 0.22 Q1, Q3, Q11, Q17, Q21
C 0.45 Q2, Q5, Q14, Q18, Q24
D 0.47 Q4, Q6, Q13, Q19, Q23
G 0.36 Q8, Q9, Q10, Q22, Q25
T 0.50 Q7, Q12, Q15, Q16, Q20
The correlation between items in the subtests can be expressed with a
correlation matrix. The correlation matrix is the correlation coefficient of
each item with every other item. A heat map of the correlation matrix can
be seen in Figure 4.3. The square regions enclose the items in a specific
concept subtest. Items within the same concept subtest should be expected
to correlate strongly with each other compared to items outside their subtest.
We do not see these types of stronger and weaker correlations.
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Figure 4.2: Difficulty vs. Discrimination
V: Red, C: Blue, D: Green, G: Orange, T: Purple
Figure 4.3: Concept Alignment of Top Quartile
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4.5 Deeper Analysis of Specific Items
The psychometric analysis of the CCI revealed that the instrument has too
many difficult items. To inform future revisions of the CCI, we are analyzing
the distractor distribution and distractor discrimination to understand why
some items are so difficult. We present an example of this for one of these
items, Q15, which had a low difficulty of 0.10 and relatively low discrimina-
tion of 0.25 in the pilot test. We compare Q15 to a stronger item, Q4, which
had a good difficulty of 0.52 and discrimination of 0.46 in the pilot test.
The distractor analysis shows the proportion of the students’ answers in
each tertile. The distractor analysis for both Q15 and Q4 can be seen in
Table 4.6. In Q4, which has a good distribution, the percentage of students
who chose the correct option increases from the bottom tertile to the top, and
the top tertile generally answers the question correctly. For Q15, although
the percentage of students who selected the correct option increases from the
bottom tertile to the top, there is little difference between the top and middle
tertiles. Additionally, the top-tertile students answered Q15 correctly 18% of
the time and instead selected distractor A 59% of the time. The preference
for option A among the top tertile is causing the item to be too difficult.
Table 4.6: Distractor Distribution (Asterisk Identifies Correct Option)
Q4
Option Lower Middle Upper
A 0.02 0 0.03
*B 0.28 0.62 0.85
C 0.11 0 0.26
D 0.37 0.14 0
E 0.22 0.24 0.10
blank 0.02 0 0
Q15
Option Lower Middle Upper
A 0.22 0.36 0.59
B 0.39 0.26 0.08
C 0.15 0.17 0.15
D 0.22 0.05 0
*E 0 0.17 0.18
blank 0.02 0 0
Table 4.7 shows the distractor discrimination value for both Q4 and Q15.
We expect the distractors to have negative discrimination values. Q4 has
negative or zero distractor discrimination values for each distractor as well
as a large positive discrimination value for the correct option. Q15 does
have a large positive discrimination value for the correct option and is even
above the minimum acceptable value, but distractor A has a larger, positive
discrimination value. This analysis reveals that the correct option is not
compelling to the strongest students. The poor performance of the strongest
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students suggests that the wording or structure of the answer options may
be to blame. We explore this assertion more in future work.
Table 4.7: Distractor Discrimination Values (Asterisk Identifies Correct
Option)
Q4
Option Discrimination
A 0
*B 0.46
C -0.14
D -0.26
E -0.04
Q15
Option Discrimination
A 0.35
B -0.19
C 0
D -0.26
*E 0.24
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This validation study revealed the CCI instrument could be used to evaluate
cybersecurity but would benefit from minor modifications. The CCI has
many good properties: high reliability and strong expert consensus on the
suitability of all items. Unfortunately, our findings revealed a few weaknesses
of the CCI as currently constructed: low reliability for individual concepts,
items that are too difficult, and too many difficult items on the instrument.
From the results of the pilot test, the CCI appears to have satisfactory
reliability, especially when compared to other CIs. The Cronbach’s α was
0.78, which is considered good for a CI. In addition to the CCI reliability, no
item deletions decrease the overall α. This result indicates that the individ-
ual items are all measuring the same construct of cybersecurity conceptual
knowledge [17]. The reliability of the instrument is necessary for the instru-
ment to be valid but not sufficient.
Experts positively reviewed each item and provided feedback to improve
the items. Experts also provided suggestions for improving the wording and
distractors of each item. We used this feedback to select the 25 items that
had the strongest consensus of quality from the experts. The expert re-
views provide evidence for the content validity of the CCI by demonstrating
that multiple cybersecurity instructors believe that the CCI items represent
conceptual knowledge that students should have after a first course in cyber-
security.
The strengths of the CCI indicate that the collection of items and individ-
ual items are well designed from an instructor perspective and reliable from
a student performance perspective. However, the student response data re-
veals that there is still room for improvement. Notably, while we designed
the CCI to assess five concepts, the student performance data did not align
well with these five concepts. For example, there is no consistent correlation
of the items within each concept subtest. Additionally, the items that consti-
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tute a subtest have low reliability; each α for the individual concept subtest
is below 0.50 [18]. Because of the low reliability of the concept subtests, we
cannot recommend using the concept subtests to assess students’ knowledge
of each concept individually.
There are two possible interpretations for this lack of correlation and reli-
ability within the concept subtests. First, it is possible that the items were
poorly designed and do not reflect the core concepts. Second, it is pos-
sible that the concepts themselves are poorly bounded, interconnected, or
too complex. Given that the expert reviewers did not express any concerns
about the content of the items, we argue that the second interpretation is
more likely.
Our finding of low correlation among concept subtests is a common find-
ing among previously published CIs [18]. The commonality of this finding
suggests that it is generally difficult for designers of an instrument to design
effective concept subtests. While most items may primarily engage students
in one concept, the concepts are likely interconnected. Students need to use
multiple concepts to answer each item correctly. We believe that this fact
may be especially true in cybersecurity, which requires individuals to consider
the motivations or capabilities of attackers, constraints or goals of defenders,
and the technologies or techniques needed to mitigate risk.
Additionally, the concepts discovered in the Delphi process may be too
complex and are really culminations of similar, but separate, concepts [3]. For
example, concept Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, and Authentication
Attacks (C) involves four unique forms of attack. A confidentiality attack
could cover attacking a secure message protocol. An availability attack could
cover a denial of service attack. Both of these examples are forms of attack
and both of them are very relevant to cybersecurity. A student, however, may
understand mechanisms that enable secure communications and still have
very little idea about denial-of-service attacks. Since each item of the CCI
must be multifaceted, creating subtests will be difficult, if not intractable,
without creating isomorphic, redundant questions.
If we want to create reliable and valid concept subtests, we may need to
consider other models for creating them. For example, we could try narrowing
the scope of concept C to just one attribute (e.g., confidentiality). This option
may not be desirable because it ignores the complexity of an attacker’s varied
motivations. Alternatively, we could create multiple instruments that more
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fully explore each of the five core concepts, but this option would dramatically
increase the work and cost of creating instruments for cybersecurity. As
currently constructed, the CCI provides a reliable instrument for measuring
a student’s overall understanding of cybersecurity, which is a much-needed
first step. Future work can explore which types of future development are
needed for creating these subtests.
Unlike the alignment of the concepts, a good range of difficulty is often
achieved in published CIs and necessary for the instrument to be valid. The
CCI is skewed to be too difficult: five items are more difficult than the
recommended level of difficulty, and for 21 out of 25 items, fewer than 50%
of students answered the item correctly. This degree of difficulty suggests
that some items need to be made easier to improve our ability to distinguish
between students with varying abilities and knowledge. Future work on the
CCI must explore how to effectively make some items easier to improve the
quality of the CCI.
5.1 Limitations
There are a number of limitations in the pilot test. The most notable limi-
tation is the depth of analysis performed on the pilot test results. IRT is not
practical with the number of students who took the pilot test but would en-
able deeper analysis. Additionally, because the Cronbach’s α for each concept
subtest was so low, we did not perform analyses such as Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (CFA) and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). These limitations
are acceptable because this study is a pilot test.
There were also limitations in the number of students from each university.
Ideally, there would be a similar number of representatives from the different
types of universities so that the results would not be dominated by University
A. The localization may have biased the findings to one university.
5.2 Future Work
We will take Q15 as a specific example of the type of modification we will
make to the difficult items. Fewer than 10% of students answered Q15 cor-
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rectly, far below what is acceptable for a CI.
The item covers finding vulnerabilities in a defense and falls under concept
Identify Vulnerabilities and Failures (V). The scenario describes a hypothet-
ical nuclear treaty between two countries that requires a method of securely
transmitting a message from a monitoring device. Neither country trusts
the other, and the design must be fair to each country. Both parties want
assurances that the message is not modified. Country A wants to ensure
that the message originates from the device. Country B wants to monitor
the message data in real time. The premise is: “The sender applies a keyed
cryptographic hash function to each message using a key distributed only
to the sender, Country A, and Country B.” Students are expected to find
potential vulnerabilities in the suggested outputs of the device.
The options the students had for Q15 are below.
(a) The message together with a hash of the following: message and current
time.
(b) The key together with a hash of the message.
(c) The message together with a hash of the message.
(d) A hash of the message.
(e) This design cannot satisfy the system requirements
Our distractor analysis revealed that the best students chose Option A
more than the correct answer. This finding reveals that, as students’ knowl-
edge increased, this wrong answer became more compelling. When con-
structed well, each item should lead students to pick the correct answer
more often as their knowledge increases.
The preference for Option A is understandable given that it is more rea-
sonable than the other three options. Options B and D do not even send the
original message so the message cannot be verified. Option A and Option C
do not guarantee that the source is sending the message: since each party
has the key, it can modify the message and attach a new hash. Because A
has the same structure as C with the addition of time being sent, it appears
to be strictly superior to C, and thus is the best option. Students must see
the problems with each option and select Option E which serves as a “none
of the above.” Including a “none of the above” in general makes assessments
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harder [24], especially because Options A and C satisfy some of the desired
properties.
The problem with the item, and further “none of the above” in general,
is that Option E makes no assertion. This fact leads students to pick the
most reasonable of the other choices. We have modified this item, changing
Option E to make an assertion. The new Option E is “The design does
not work because Countries A and B can modify the message.” This new
wording provides a definite assertion, which students can check and conclude
that the other options do not satisfy the requirements. We anticipate that
this change, while minor, will make the item easier and differentiate more
students.
After making similar modifications to other items, our next work is to
administer the instrument to more students and reanalyze the results. With
the easier items, the difficulty will cover a better range and better separate
students. The range of difficulties and modification of items that are too
difficult should increase the discriminatory power of the CCI and improve
the CCI’s validity and usefulness.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the expert review and pilot test was to evaluate the validity
of the CCI. The expert review and pilot testing of the CCI revealed the
CCI reliably tests students’ knowledge of cybersecurity. At this point, the
CCI could be used as an evaluation instrument, but the scores would be
low. The low scores reduce the discriminatory power of the assessment. By
making the CCI easier, we will be able to create an assessment that should
be broadly applicable and provide useful measurements of a broad range of
cybersecurity students. Further research will cover the modifications of the
items and testing with more students.
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APPENDIX A ITEM DETAILS
Table A.1: Information About CCI Items
Name ID Estimated Difficulty Concept Topic Scenario
Q1 A1-1 Medium T MAC A1
Q2 A2-1 Easy G MAC A2
Q3 A2-4 Medium T Non-Repudiation A2
Q4 A3-3 Medium D Input Validation A3
Q5 A4-1 Medium G Network Design A4
Q6 A4-2 Medium D Network Design A4
Q7 A4-3 Medium V Network Design A4
Q8 B1-2 Medium C Replay Attack B1
Q9 B1-3 Medium C Integrity B1
Q10 B2-1 Medium C Physical Attack B2
Q11 B2-2 Medium T Insider Threat B2
Q12 B3-1 Easy V Security Theater B3
Q13 B4-1 Hard D PKC B4
Q14 B4-2 Medium G Replay Attack B4
Q15 B4-3 Medium V Authentication B4
Q16 B4-4 Medium V PKC B4
Q17 C1-1 Easy T Authentication C1
Q18 C2-1 Medium G Authorization C2
Q19 C3a-1 Easy D Encryption C3
Q20 C3b-1 Hard V Linkage C3
Q21 C4-1 Easy T Social Engineering C4
Q22 C4-2 Medium C Biometric Authentication C4
Q23 D1-1 Easy D Network Isolation D1
Q24 T1-1 Medium G Selecting Targets T1
Q25 Z2-1 Hard C Protocols Z2
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APPENDIX B FULL ASSESSMENT
This appendix includes the full CCI as given to the students in the pilot test.
The instructions and introduction are as seen by the students.
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